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1.  Life in a day of a cube
This paper is about cubes. We live in a world overcrowded with cubes and 
cuboid forms. Cubes are a natural phenomenon (in the primitive cubic crys-
tal systems like pyrite, and in the multi–element compounds like caesium 
chloride and rock–salt structure) and a man–made thing as well (stone–cubes 
are still present in houses and other architectural designs, and it seems illus-
trative to mention that Haus Wittgenstein is also cubic or at least cuboid in 
its basic form, as shown in Illustration 1). Take a look at cities, streets, build-
ings, houses, rooms, windows, furniture, home appliances and packaging. 
Cubes are the topic in poetry, novels, paintings, sculptures, films, TV series 
and computer games. Given that cubes and cuboid forms are more frequent 
as a man–made then as a natural structures, besides many other symbolic 
uses, they are often taken as a signal of order, rationality and intelligence.
Illustration 1: Left: Pyrite cubic crystals on marlstone, from Navajún, Rioja, 
Spain. Size: 95 mm x 78 mm. Main crystal: 31 mm on edge. Mass: 512 g. 
(2009, URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2780M–pyrite1.jpg), Right: 
Haus Wittgenstein (2003, URL: https://www.nextroom.at/building.php?id=2338)
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This paper is about cubes that Wittgenstein was drawing and describing 
in his works. Especially about two cubes, the one in TLP and the other in 
PPF (ex PI II). He never referred either to Necker’s paper (Necker 1832), to 
the Necker’s cube, nor did the likely sources in which he may have found the 
illustration of the cube (Jastrow 1900). So, it is perhaps misleading to call his 
TLP cube the Necker’s cube. Since we have no evidence of the source of the 
TLP cube, while the probable source of the PPF cube is his own TLP cube 
and Jastrow’s cube, it also seems possible that he reinvented the TLP cube. 
(1) All we can be sure of concerning Wittgenstein’s cubes is that he 
knew of puzzle pictures (NB 1979 p. 28, 9.11.14.), that drawings of 
cubes appear in many works (BT, BB, Z, PI and RPP I), that there are 
many mentions and remarks on such multi–aspectual cubes, that the 
drawing of the Necker’s cube model appears in PT (PT 1971 6.0051) 
and in TLP (TLP 1974 5.5432) with small differences in drawings, 
that the different drawing of the cube appears in PPF (PPF 2009 116) 
and in RPP I (RPP I 1980 9) with some small differences in texts and 
which seems to refer to the TLP cube. 
Concerning actual illustrations TLP has 9 tables, schemes and drawings 
on 89 pages, while PI has 18 of them on 240 pages (7 in PI and 11 in PPF). PI 
has much more textual examples of visual phenomena, scenes, and images 
then TLP which means that PI is more pictorial then TLP. However, contrary 
to this, TLP is actually more illustrated then PI which doesn’t seem to be the 
first impression. Before we turn to Wittgenstein’s cubes it seems appropriate 
to describe the Necker’s cube and to supply a note on recent literature on 
comparison between cubes in the TLP and the PPF. The general structure of 
the argument will be the following (as shown Table 1).
Table 1: The general structure of the argument given by the relations of the 
major and auxiliary remarks listed here from (1) to (5).
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1.1. A note on scientific observations and research of the
 Necker’s cube 
A short description of the Necker’s cube will be supplied here as a kind of 
prescript. A part of the description and the explanation by Necker from his 
1832 paper is the following.
“The object I have now to call your attention to, is an observation which is also 
of an optical nature, and which has often occurred to me while examining fig-
ures and engraved plates of crystalline forms: I mean a sudden and involuntary 
change in the apparent position of a crystal or solid represented in an engraved 
figure. (..) I have been a long time at a loss to understand the, reason of the appar-
ently accidental and involuntary change which I always witnessed in all sorts of 
forms in books of crystallography. The only thing I could observe was, that at the 
time the change took place, a particular sensation was felt in the eye (for it takes 
place as well when seen with only one eye, as with both eyes), which proved to 
me that it was an optical, and not merely as I had at first thought a mental, opera-
tion which was performed. After, however, a more attentive analysis of the fact, 
it occurred to me, that it was owing to all involuntary change in the adjustment 
of the eye for obtaining distinct vision.” (Necker 1832, pp. 336–337)
The phenomenon of this optical illusion was known for centuries be-
fore the Necker’s observations. For instance, this illusion was found as a 
mosaic on the floor of one of the houses in the Pompeii archeological site 
that was preserved after the AD 79 eruption of the Mount Vesuvius. How-
ever, Necker’s paper seems to be the first recorded scientific publication as 
an attempt of a scientific description and explanation of the phenomenon. 
Perhaps there were earlier similar descriptions and explanations, but they 
are unknown.
The Necker’s cube is an optical illusion, i.e. an illusion caused by vi-
sion characterized by a visual percept that ‘looks’ different from reality. It 
is a simple wireframe drawing of a cube with no sensory cues (e.g. depth, 
contrast or color). Therefore, the Necker’s cube (as shown in Illustration 2) 
is interpreted by normally sighted people to have either the lower–left as its 
front side and the upper–right as its back side or vice versa.
Illustration 2: The Necker cube. Upper cube is the actual drawing, while 
lower cubes are two possible ways of seeing the drawing, i.e. either the 
lower–left side or the upper–right side as being its front side, but not both 
simultaneously (illustration by the author).
Kristijan Krkač: Steadily Cubic: a Squared Odyssey DISPUTATIO PHILOSOPHICA
50
The Necker’s cube is also an ambiguous drawing that can remain in one 
stable state (of perception) and then change to another stable state (lower 
cubes in Illustration 2). This phenomenon is called bistable or multistable 
perception. The opposite of such ambiguous drawings (like the Müller–Lyer 
arrows) are impossible objects (such as the impossible cube that represents 
both stable states of the Necker’s cube). The lower–left state of perception in 
Illustration 2 seems to be more frequent because people view objects mostly 
from above (Troje and McAdam 2010) and because they view objects from 
left to right (Khan and Crawford 2001). They tend to see the upper cube as 
the lower left cube with the lower–left side as its front side first. People can 
naturally switch from seeing one to another state (of perception) spontane-
ously or by focusing on particular parts of the drawing (mostly to the lower–
left or to the upper–right parts of it).
Scientific explanations of the phenomenon of change of interpretation/
perception of the Necker’s cube roughly fall in two groups; bottom–up and 
top–down explanations. (Kornmeier and Bach 2005, 2012) Authors write 
about a ‘mental switch’ between seeing different appearances of the drawing 
and this is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s ‘aspect–change’ (in his early phi-
losophy perhaps taken from Hertz 1956 and Boltzmann 1974 and in his later 
from Jastrow 1900 and mostly from Köhler 1929).
“Most hypothetical explanations about the neural processes underlying sponta-
neous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures fall into two classes, emphasiz-
ing either bottom–up, or top–down factors. Bottom–up approaches assume the 
perceptual reversal results from passive adaptation early in the visual stream. 
(…) Top–down approaches emphasize attentional or expectational factors, act-
ing in a centrally governed active decision process near awareness and conse-
quently later in the visual hierarchy.” (Kornmeier and Bach 2005, p. 955) 
Both approaches have their well–known defenders and are backed by 
measurements, studies, and effects of experience, learning and cognitive 
states of the subjects. What is interesting is that experiments showed that “dis-
ambiguation of ambiguous figures seems to occur already 200–300ms before 
perceptual awareness is established”. (Kornmeier and Bach 2005, p. 959) 
What seems important here is that there is no reliable scientific explana-
tion that is backed by solid evidence and that would dismiss all other rival 
explanations. In other words, analyzing Wittgenstein’s standpoint on this 
matter is still puzzling from scientific and from conceptual point of view.
1.2. A note on previous research of Wittgenstein’s TLP and PPF cubes
Concerning the topic of the present research there are only few texts that 
analyze Wittgenstein’s drawings of the cube and accompanied remarks from 
TLP (TLP 1974 5.5432) and even fewer that do this in comparison with the 
cube from PPF (PPF 2009 116). 
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Among older works there is the paper by J. Hintikka’s and M. B. Hintik-
ka’s ‘Ludwig looks at the Necker Cube: The Problem of ‘Seeing As’ as a Clue 
to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy’ (Hintikka and Hintikka 1996, pp. 179–191). 
Their paper is important mostly because it suggests the comparison of the 
TLP–cube and the PI–cube on the same grounds. 
“In his belatedly (1984) published book Theory of Knowledge, which Russell 
wrote in 1913 but left unpublished because of Wittgenstein’s criticisms, Russell 
extends this semantical theory to complex propositions and more generally to 
questions of logical form. In order to understand, e.g., the unanalyzable rela-
tional proposition ‘aRb’, one has to be acquainted with the entities a, R, and 
b. But this is not enough, for it does not, e.g., distinguish ‘aRb’ semantically. 
Hence, according to Russell’s onetime theory, one must also be acquainted with 
a fourth entity, the logical form of ‘aRb’. (…) The operative feature of the situa-
tion Wittgenstein envisages here [5.5423] is that one and the same configuration 
of physical objects can give rise to two different perceptual experiences. Witt-
genstein tries to explain this by saying that the two experiences are perceptions 
of two different facts. Since facts are configurations of objects and since there is 
only one physical configuration here, Wittgenstein is obviously assuming that 
the facts he is talking about are configurations of phenomenological (perceptual) 
objects. Thus 5.5423 is unmistakably predicated on the assumption that Witt-
genstein’s objects in the Tractatus are phenomenological objects, just as we have 
argued. This simple and perhaps rather obvious analysis of Tractatus 5.5423 also 
provides a key to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘seeing as’ in such later writings as 
the Philosophical Investigations.” (Hintikka and Hintikka 1996, pp. 179, 181–2)
Among newer works there is M. ter Hark’s paper ‘Aspect perception in 
the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations’ (ter Hark 2015, pp. 165–
182). Ter Hark discusses the paper by Hintikka and Hintikka and few older 
texts and comes up with a solution that resolves the supposed paradox of 
seeing the same and the different.
“It is this intersection of two uses of words, two language games, which Witt-
genstein failed to recognize in the Tractatus. It is also this failure to see that two 
different uses of concepts, e.g. ‘organization’ in the transitive and intransitive 
sense, intertwine which Wittgenstein recognizes in Köhler’s theory of percep-
tion.” (ter Hark 2015, p. 179) 
Since there are only few works that discuss TLP–cube and TLP–cube 
compared to PPF–cube and since such comparison seems intriguing for sev-
eral philosophical reasons, in what follows some remarks on these illustra-
tions and texts will be made. Since there are significantly more comments of 
PPF–cube connected to other illustrations, mostly to The Duck–rabbit head, 
and with broader issues, such as seeing–as and perception, these texts will 
not be discussed, but mentioned if necessary. 
(1.1) The limited number of analyses comparing the TLP and the PPF 
cubes in philosophical papers and books on Wittgenstein seems at 
least strange if the PPF–cube belongs to Wittgenstein’s corrections 
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that he made in PI concerning ‘grave mistakes’ of TLP in this case of 
the TLP–cube (PI 2009, p. 4). 
(1.1.1) The probable cause of this lack of literature may lie in the fact 
that the there is a general standpoint which says the two cubes are 
connected with the two different issues, namely, the TLP–cube to the 
issue of Russell’s standpoints on complexes and facts, and the PPF–
cube to the issue of interpretation of ambiguous drawings. 
(1.1.2) As opposed minority opinion to such major standpoint, some phi-
losophers (among which are Hintikkas and ter Hark) think there is a 
common ground between these illustrations, accompanied texts and 
their places in the contexts of the basic ideas of both Wittgenstein’s 
works. Remark (1) supplies the reference for the second opinion, 
since it seems that Wittgenstein knew and was interested in ‘puzzle 
pictures’ during his whole philosophical career, and in the PT, TLP 
as well as in the PI, PPF and RPP. 
(1.1.3) Nevertheless, if one analyses them together in the contexts of the 
works they belong to and compares them, this doesn’t contradict the 
possibility that both cubes are more closely connected then it seems. 
Remarks supplied hereafter generally aim at supporting the exegeti-
cal hypothesis mentioned in (1.1.2). 
2.  Cubes and fascination
(2) Wittgenstein, as a thinker sensitive to pictorial aspects of thought and 
philosophy, frequently used tables, figures, schemes and drawings 
in his writings in order to illustrate examples and/or ideas or ‘visual 
images that occurred to him’ (PPO 2003 123). 
Wittgenstein was fond of images, drawings, illustrations and pictures 
perhaps partly because he was thinking mostly in pictures (which one can 
only speculate about), partly because of his education as engineer (Hamilton 
2001) and partly because his concepts of image and picture were aestheti-
cally and philosophically important in both his early and later philosophy 
(Janik and Toulmin 1973). Some of his illustrations were borrowed from 
others (like Necker’s Cube or Jastrow’s Duck–rabbit head), while others he 
re/invented (like truth tables, smiling faces, drawing of patents or drawings 
of various mechanical models). While he used the majority of such images 
only in some periods of his philosophy, he used only a few throughout the 
whole career. The most frequent illustrations are dots, lines, arrows, various 
grids, circles, squares, pentagrams, hexagrams, pyramids, cubes etc. 
(2.1) Wittgenstein used an illustration of a cube continuously from his 
early to his later works, sometimes in different ways in order to il-
lustrate (some argue radically) different ideas. These illustrations 
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are perhaps more significant than others frequently used since they 
seem to illustrate his foremost early and later ideas. 
Additionally, illustrations of a cube are the only illustrations that were 
and still are of similar interest to scientists, artists, and philosophers (the 
scientific research on Necker’s cube includes dozens of experiments with 
the drawing itself, light, eye movement, seeing, neural processes etc. and 
cannot even be summarized here, but it needs to be taken into account con-
cerning all of Wittgenstein’s cubes, see section 1.1). 
(2.2) The TLP–cube (TLP 1974 5.5432) seems to illustrate early ideas 
about meaning, proposition and fact, while the PPF–cube (PPF 2009 
116) as the later correction seems to criticize the earlier idea illus-
trated by the TLP–cube and to introduce new one. However, this is 
only a hypothesis since there is no conclusive evidence. 
The following remarks from PI seem to confirm this point, since we can-
not find any other illustration so continuously and purposely used in two 
different ways concerning significant ideas of his philosophy (we can find 
other frequently used illustrations and even some descriptions and explica-
tions, but these are not as closely connected to his major ideas as the exam-
ple of a cube accompanied with the illustration).
I have purposely so chosen the example [of a cube] that it is quite easy to imag-
ine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all. The 
picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was also pos-
sible for me to use it differently. (…) Then what was the nature of my mistake 
— the mistake one would like to express by saying ‘I thought the picture forced 
a particular use on me?’ How could I think that? What did I think? Is there a 
picture, or something like a picture, that forces a particular application on us; 
so that my mistake amounted to a confusion? (…) What was the effect of my 
argument? It called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that there are other 
processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes 
be prepared to call ‘applying the picture of a cube’. So our ‘belief that the picture 
forced a particular application upon us’ consisted in the fact that only the one 
case and no other occurred to us. ‘There is another solution as well’ means: there 
is something else that I’m also prepared to call a ‘solution’, to which I’m pre-
pared to apply such–and–such a picture, such–and–such an analogy, and so on. 
(…) Can’t I now imagine different applications of this schema too? — Well, yes, 
but can’t an application come before my mind? It can: only we need to become 
clearer about our application of this expression. (PI 2009 139–41)
(2.3) So, it seems that he used the same example in both cases purpose-
fully, since the TLP–cube is closely connected to the idea of a com-
plex and the form aRb which he criticized in the middle period and 
later on in PI and PPF by use of the PPF–cube. (The issue of the 
difference between applications of a picture given in advance and 
applications of a picture determining the picture itself will be dis-
cussed later on.)
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However, things are more complicated than this, since it seems impor-
tant to differentiate between a mentioning the word and discussing it on the 
one hand and illustrating the example and discussing it on the other.
First, the word cube is mentioned more than 100 times in his works and 
discussed in detail at least 20 times. A cube as an example is connected to 
the TLP concepts of a proposition and of a complex, and to the PI concepts 
of a language–game and of an aspect–change. An illustration of a cube ap-
pears in different works besides the most famous illustrations in the TLP 
(1974 5.5432) and the PPF (2009 116), e.g. in BT (2005 39), Z (1981 249), 
BBB (1969 163), and the one from PPF (2009 116) repeats in RPP I (1980 9). 
In Z there is besides two cubes the only attempt to draw a four–dimensional 
cube (as shown in Illustration 3). 
Illustration 3: Five examples of Wittgenstein’s cubes. Upper row from the left 
to the right: TLP, BT, BB Lower row: Z, and PI (which repeats in RPP I).
Finally, the word cube and the discussion accompanied with an illus-
tration appear only 10 times given that some remarks and illustrations are 
repeated in various works (e.g. in the PPF and the RPP). 
(2.4) These remarks with illustrations are important because illustrations 
aren’t just visual aspects of his textual description of examples. They 
add something to the text, namely, one can actually see what he 
meant by the text (and that the text was perhaps only an afterword 
to the ‘image that occurred to him’). Now, what, if anything, does an 
illustration add to the description of an example of a cube? 
In the following sections, the TLP–cube and the PPF–cube texts will be 
described in the context of the basic ideas of the TLP and the PPF (PI includ-
ed), analyzed and compared. This procedure should establish solid grounds 
for drawing conclusions concerning the importance of a cube–example not 
only in itself, but also for understanding the differences and similarities be-
tween the TLP and the PI (PPF) in terms of the object and the method in 
both works. 
An additional reason for discussing the TLP and the PPF–cube together 
isn’t just the fact that the PPF–cube is a purposeful later response to his own 
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previous TLP–cube, but also the fact that he wanted PI and TLP to be pub-
lished together in order for readers to see ‘the new ideas in the light of the 
old ones’, i.e. his earlier ‘grave mistakes’ (PI 2009, p. 4).
Furthermore, perhaps the conclusion of this research could contribute 
not only to putting the same weight on Wittgenstein’s texts as well as to his 
drawings and sketches, but also on understanding him as a uniquely pictori-
ally sensitive thinker and philosopher. 
3.  T–cube pleasantly disturbed by P–cube
The most famous examples are cubes in TLP and PPF (ex PI II). While in 
TLP (1974 5.5423, see Z 1981 249) he seems to have used Necker’s Cube 
from some unknown source in order to illustrate the relation of parts and 
complexes concerning the structure of a proposition and its relation to a 
fact, in PPF he used the drawing of an ordinary non–Necker cube, in fact a 
rectangular cuboid in order to illustrate the variety of its uses and its relation 
to its interpretation that follows, with a quite important note about the inter-
pretation, i.e. ‘So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.’ (PPF 2009 116).
(3) There are two cubes, the one in TLP (TLP 1974 5.5.423), and the 
other in PPF (PPF 2009 116) with accompanied texts (both shown in 
Table 2). (In the following text TLP 1974 5.5423 will be abbreviated 
as the T–cube and PPF 2009 116 will be abbreviated as the P–cube.)
Table 2: Parallel texts of TLP 1974 5.5423 and PPF 2009 116 with underlined 
words and expressions that seem to be important for the illustrations, texts, 
and analysis of their relations.
(3.1) It is a speculation to call the T–cube the Necker’s cube, but it is 
justified to call it Wittgenstein’s drawing of the Necker’s cube model, 
and also to call the P–cube a cube at all, because it seems to be more 
like a cuboid form then a cube. 
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(3.1.1) Concerning the context and relevance of the cited places from the 
TLP and the PI (as shown in Table 2), it should be mentioned that 
the TLP text and illustration are related to complexes (aRb), proposi-
tions, and facts (see TLP 1974 2.0201, 3.1432, 3.24, 3.3442, 4.2211), 
while the PPF text is related to aspect–change seeing/describing, to 
the morphology and grammar of use, and PPF illustration is related 
to many examples, descriptions and remarks on the use of the word 
‘cube’ (see PI 2009 74, 139; PPF 2009 135, 173, 218–9, 236, 258). So 
far as the TLP (philosophical) logic become a “chapter” in PI (philo-
sophical), it can be assumed that the T–cube and its two aspects 
become parts of P–cube and its grammar of many aspects.
(3.2) In PI 2009 141 (quoted in the 2nd section) it seems that an impor-
tant difference is set concerning the T–cube and the P–cube, namely 
the one between:
(3.2.1) ‘The picture [of a cube] that we visualize’ and 
(3.2.2) ‘The application [or use] that we make of this image [of a cube]’ 
(Italics are added; see Baker and Hacker 2009, pp. 297–302). 
It seems that (3.2.1) applies to the T–cube, while (3.2.2) applies to the 
P–cube. So, (3.2.1) and (3.2.2) can serve as a criterion of differentiation be-
tween T–cube and P–cube. Concerning the analysis of the T–cube and the 
P–cube, the following seems to be clear. There is an obvious difference at the 
beginning of the both texts.
(3.3.1) ‘Seeing the figure’ (the T–cube) is a quite specific expression (PPF 
2009 135),
(3.3.2) ‘Imagining the illustration’ is quite different from (3.2.1).
There is also very important difference between the drawings them-
selves.
(3.4.1) The T–cube is a geometrical drawing of cube with six square 
sides and two opposite sides differed by letters on the corners of 
each side (vertices).
(3.4.2) The P–cube is a sketch not even of a cube, rather of a cube–like 
body, a rectangular cuboid in fact or something like a brick or a slab. 
Further on, there is a difference in possibilities of the T and P–cubes. 
(3.5.1) For the T–cube it is said that it has ‘two possible ways’ of appearing.
(3.5.2) While for the P–cube it is said that it can appear ‘in several places’.
Therefore, the range of possibilities is in a way broadened from the logi-
cal possibilities, which are only two in the case of T–cube, to the possibili-
ties of real practical and imagined situations which are numerous in the case 
of the P–cube. Namely, in the T–cube case there is only the possibility that 
‘a–side’ is in front while ‘b–side’ is in the back and vice versa, and in the P–
cube there are much more possibilities, e.g. a glass cube, a wire frame etc. 
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(3.6.1) In the case of the T–cube the logic behind it and previous to it 
‘explains’ two possibilities of seeing ‘two different facts.’ i.e. two con-
figurations of objects (Hintikka and Hintikka 1996, p. 182).
(3.6.2) In the case of the P–cube the ‘interpretation’ of it and after it (or 
simultaneously with the seeing of it) interprets what we imagine. 
There are no previously given possible facts (states of affairs), rather 
many interpretations.
In fact, there are no just two possible facts concerning the T–cube, i.e. 
seeing the T–cube in two 3D ways, but also the third way of seeing T–cube 
in a 2D way and in 3D way (as shown in Illustration 4).
Illustration 4: Necker’s cube seen in 3 dimensions and in only 2 dimensions, 
i.e. as a cube (or an open box and as a hexagon in which vertices are 
connected by lines.
These are some basic differences between the T–cube and the P–cube 
examples. They both seem to be examples of much more basic ideas of both 
works they belong to (TLP and PPF, PI). However, in order to explicate both 
examples in more detail, additional information on their origin is needed. 
4.  Glittering cube cubify yourself
Both the T–cube and the P–cube are ambiguous but for different reasons. Let 
us start with the T–cube. The source of Wittgenstein’s T–cube is uncertain, 
i.e. there is no clear derivation from Necker’s text and drawing (Necker 1832, 
pp. 329–337) to Wittgenstein’s text and drawing, and that is the problem of 
its historical origin. 
The P–cube is a “purposely chosen” drawing (PI 2009 139). It is similar 
to cubes and slabs of his builders from the beginning of PI (PI 2009 2–21), to 
other previous cube remarks in PPF, PI and earlier works after TLP. The moti-
vation for the P–cube is not clear, but one can hypothesize that it is related to 
his personal architectural and engineering expertise and results. The nature 
of the P–cube is explicated by Wittgenstein himself. It is a drawing chosen 
‘purposely’ in order to refer to the T–cube and to the cubic representation 
of isomorphism, formalized correspondence, or picturing between proposi-
tions and facts. (TLP 1974 2.1–2.225) However, among cubes in the later 
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works, especially in the PPF, there is no explicit reference to the T–Cube. 
(ter Hark 2015, p. 165)
(4) So far we can hypothesize the nature and purpose of the P–cube, and 
its possible relation to the T–cube. However, the nature, purpose and 
origin of the T–cube are even less certain. Its nature and purpose are 
a little clearer if one relates it to the nature of complexes (aRb), and 
to the relation of propositions and facts (see previously 3.1.1). How-
ever, its name and origin are unclear. For one thing, in Wittgenstein’s 
published works, Necker or Necker’s cube aren’t mentioned at all. 
However, the T–cube is an obvious illustration and description of 
Necker’s cube model as given in Jastrow (Jastrow 1899, 1900). 
So, the question is where from did Wittgenstein find the idea for T–cube, 
or from which author? There’s no mention of such cube, of Necker or of 
Necker’s cube in W. James’s The Principles of Psychology (James [1890]1983). 
There are mentions in Köhler’s Gestalt psychology (Köhler 1929) which was 
published after the TLP. It should be mentioned that James cited Jastrow 
in his Principles a lot, but it doesn’t seem that any quote is related to the 
Necker’s cube. However, in Jastrow’s Fact and Fable in Psychology (Jastrow 
1990, p. 289) the Necker cube is explained and there are illustrations. It is 
remarkably similar to the illustration by Necker (1832, p. 336) (as shown in 
Illustration 5).
Illustration 5: Necker’s cube by Necker (1832) and by Jastrow (1990).
There is obvious similarity between Necker and Jastrow’s illustrations 
and descriptions of the phenomenon and the illusion. However, Jastrow 
doesn’t mention Necker while supplying the illustration. Further on, there is 
a difference between illustrating tools in Jastrow and Wittgenstein, because 
Jastrow, as well as Necker, uses a diagonal line, while Wittgenstein uses let-
ters a and b to point to different ways of seeing.
(4.1) Wittgenstein was almost certainly influenced by Jastrow (1990), 
James ([1890], 1983), and by Köhler (1929) in his later works from 
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1929 onwards, but where does the T–cube comes from? He finished 
the TLP in 1918 and the illustration was already there. Even in 1914 
in NB he writes ‘Puzzle pictures and seeing of situations.’ (NB 1979 
p. 28, 9.11.14.). Besides the fact that we don’t know what kind of 
puzzle picture he had in mind, he was obviously acquainted with 
the concept and at least with some examples of puzzle pictures.
We also don’t know whether he read James and Jastrow in the period of 
studying with Russell (1911–1914). We know that in this period he read oth-
er James’ books but we don’t know whether he read James’s Principles or Jas-
trow’s Fact and Fable (it would be interesting to research the Jastrow’s book 
at the Trinity’s Library in the period 1911–1914). His first mentions of James 
and Jastrow are from the early 1930s, not before. However, as a student of 
Russell and friend of Moore, given that they discussed James before 1918 
and that Russell mentions James in his works, it is certain that he heard of 
James and read at least Varieties of Religious Experience (as he wrote to Rus-
sell in a letter on 26.12.1912). (LD 2008, p. 30) For example, Wittgenstein 
criticized Russell’s manuscript of Theory of Knowledge in 1913 in which 
Russell discusses James, so it is clear that Wittgenstein heard of James and 
read some James’s works. (Russell [1913], 1992, pp. vii–xlvii)
Perhaps this search for influences on the TLP in psychology is generally 
mistaken, because Wittgenstein’s major influences in those days and years 
before the period of study were in physics, namely, in works of Hertz and 
Boltzmann. Wittgenstein was reading Boltzmann on some occasions previ-
ous to 1911 and during his turn to philosophy, and he even planned to study 
physics under Boltzmann’s supervision (after 1906). Concerning the influ-
ence of Boltzmann, J. M. Preston writes the following.
“One aspect of Boltzmann’s scientific work that has often been thought to leave 
its mark on the Tractatus is his development of the idea of phase–space. A phase–
space is a multidimensional geometrical representation of a given system, each 
axis of which represents a degree of freedom of that system. The resulting ‘space’ 
charts every possible state of the system, each such state corresponding to a 
single point in the phase–space, and each change of state corresponding to a tra-
jectory there.” (Preston 2017, p. 117, see Janik and Toulmin 1973, pp. 120–202)
The idea of the phase–space is well illustrated by the T–cube and its 
connection to complexes and logical space. However, the point of the use of 
the T–cube isn’t clear. Concerning this matter, Boltzmann writes the follow-
ing, and the following citation is the best what can be found in Boltzmann’s 
writings that could influence Wittgenstein’s drawing of the T–cube. 
“He [the person who is philosophically trained] is convinced that these concepts 
are taken straight from experience and not explicable further, so that here the 
now irresistible mental habit of asking for the cause and definition overshoots 
the mark, but still he cannot overcome a certain residual dissatisfaction that 
such important concepts as number or causality defy all attempts at definition. 
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It is as when an optical illusion fails to vanish even after one has clarified its 
mechanical cause. (Boltzmann 1974, p. 137) It is exactly as with ordinary sense 
illusions, which continue to exist even after their cause has been recognized. 
Hence the feeling of insecurity, the lack of satisfaction that grips the scientist 
when he philosophizes. Only very slowly and gradually will all these illusions 
recede and I regard it as a central task of philosophy to give a clear account of the 
inappropriateness of this overshooting the mark on the part of our thinking hab-
its; and further, in choosing and linking concepts and words, to aim only at the 
most appropriate expression of the given, irrespective of our inherited habits. 
Then, gradually, these tangles and contradictions must disappear.” (Boltzmann 
1974, p. 167)
The fact here is that neither in Hertz, nor in Boltzmann is there any 
direct evidence for the introduction of the T–cube. So we do not know the 
source of the T–cube. Since such optical illusions and multi–aspectual draw-
ings were published in various popular magazines, it wouldn’t be surprising 
that Wittgenstein saw something similar in a humor magazine like Fliegende 
Blätter where the Duck–rabbit was originally published in 1892, the same 
year in Harper’s Weekly magazine, and from that illustration it ended in Jas-
trow’s paper (Jastrow 1899) and later in his book (Jastrow 1990) where from 
Wittgenstein quoted it.
However, these quotes from Boltzmann seem to be connected to the pur-
pose of introducing not only the T–cube in TLP, but of the P–cube in PPF too.
(4.2) The ‘grave mistake’ with the T–cube is resolved by introduction 
of the P–cube. It is not just that the T–cube has been seen–as differ-
ently, but the very concept of seeing–as has been seen from the new 
aspect.
(4.2.1) It was thought that T–cube was the answer to the question about 
full representation of facts by a configuration of objects in the logical 
space (similar to phase–space), but it was the problem, because not 
only was a proposition a picture and a model, but a configuration 
was also a picture and a model.
(4.2.2) The solution to the problem of the T–cube is the P–cube in terms 
that there is an illustration of the P–cube, but there is also a mod-
eling and perspicuous presentation of many interpretations of the 
illustration of the P–cube which determines how we can see the il-
lustration for various practical applications or purposes (here enters 
the whole story from psychology connected to the texts of Jastrow 
and Köhler from the early 1930s).
In order to see the T–cube not as a solution to some problem, rather as a 
problem in itself (leading to the basic issue of the complex aRb), one needs 
to see that there are not only two ways of seeing T–cube (i.e. a–a–a–a and 
b–b–b–b) because that was presupposed. One needs to see that if a cube 
is simply drawn differently, e.g. as the P–cube, this expands the space for 
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more than two interpretations, as well as the philosophical logic expands 
the space for the philosophical grammar (with logic being only a chapter of 
it), cases or facts for forms of life, propositions for language–games, pictures 
for perspicuous representations and models for an activity of modeling.
(4.3) Conceptions of the interpretation and perspicuous presentation of 
the whole illustration is determined not by anything within the illus-
tration or for that matter by anything in our minds, but by an actual 
practice of application of the illustration. 
(4.3.1) Not the problem of ‘seeing–as’ should be viewed ‘as a clue to 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy’ (Hintikka and Hintikka, 1996), rather the 
‘lighting up of an aspect’ (PPF 2008 118). The aspect–change from 
the T–cube to the P–cube can be viewed as one of the symbols of 
Wittgenstein’s whole philosophy as being at least partly pictorial, 
since, after all, symbols are looked at, recognized and used for practi-
cal purposes. 
Here remarks from (4) to (4.3.1) aim at the further description of the rela-
tion of the T–cube and the P–cube that was basically described in remarks 
from (1) to (3.6.2). Concerning the remarks (4.3 and 4.3.1), there is no inter-
pretative dependence of the remarks in this section on the remarks of the 3rd 
section. It is only a possible interpretation of both cubes and their relations 
and is this interpretation more probable than the opposite one it is hard to 
decide. Further on, if the P–cube is one among many parallel issues in PI and 
TLP by which Wittgenstein wanted not just to point out his previous ‘grave 
mistake’ with the T–cube, but also what is the correct answer in the P–cube, 
then the whole issue can be made structurally parallel to many others in PI 
and PPF that seem to respond to those of TLP. 
Finally, if the P–cube was the response to the T–cube as the question 
(or as an incorrect answer) influenced by new sources from psychology, 
then the same cannot be said about the T–cube, because even if general 
sources were recognized, the particular source of it isn’t known. We simply 
do not know what the actual source of the T–cube was. Any further conclu-
sion from the given evidence and premises simply cannot be drawn. Before 
supplying an unscientific postscript in the absence of a solid conclusion it 
seems appropriate to at least ask the question that was implied throughout 
the whole text.
(4.4) If for a moment we suppose that all previously said is correct and 
important, then what does it say about not only the nature of Witt-
genstein’s philosophy, but also about the nature of philosophy gener-
ally speaking, and perhaps about human thinking too? 
By asking (4.4) we aren’t asking about measurable features of human 
or philosophical thinking, or about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, rather about 
the originality and uniqueness of ‘the pictorial’ that cannot be fully trans-
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lated into words and vice versa (being entirely aware that there is no a sharp 
boundary between words and pictures, and that words are primarily acous-
tic not visual phenomena). Much cannot be said here based solely on two 
Wittgenstein’s drawings and short quotes. However, one could imagine the 
T and the P–cube quotes done only via (perhaps slightly modified) draw-
ings and only by words as two radical cases (and not mixed). Perhaps such 
experiment on the understanding, interpretation, and application of them 
(pure text and pure illustration) could throw some light and in part show us 
the direction in which we should look for the answer to the question in (4.4). 
5.  T–cube: Don’t you P–cube forget about me
This strange philosophical issue about the T–cube and the P–cube is that just 
by observing them one can easily understand the basic subject matter of the 
TLP and of the PPF (PI), the methods used and goals aimed at in both works.
(5) In short and in rather poetic jargon it can be said that the T–cube is 
a symbol of a static model (the irony of calling it dynamic by follow-
ing Hertz in TLP 1974 4.04) of a formalized language concerning the 
issue of the meaning and sense of a proposition, while the P–cube is 
a symbol of dynamic activity of modeling (an application of a model) 
and morphological perspicuous (re)presenting of the grammar of our 
ordinary language (echoing Goethe and Spengler) concerning the is-
sue of the meaning as use of our ordinary words and sentences. 
(5.1) By putting these two illustrations one next to the other and by sup-
plying some basic descriptions and questions about them one can 
create the symbol of the larger part of Wittgenstein’s complete phi-
losophy. The point is not just that each cube perhaps (re)presents at 
least a part of different philosophical standpoint, but also that the 
second cube if put next to the first one (re)present at least a part of 
the difference between two philosophical standpoints. Perhaps the 
P–cube is the ‘visible evidence of the limitations of an application of 
the T–cube’ (noted by Jim Hamlyn in private correspondence)? 
It is often claimed with a series of illustrated and illustrative examples 
that sketches, drawings and pictures comprise a huge amount of data via use 
of more or less simple images. This is mostly claimed in the field of engi-
neering design (Petroski 1989, 2011), but also in connecting engineering and 
philosophy (Christiansen et. al. 2012) and engineering, information and art 
(Tufte 1990, Allen 2008). To some extent different source, namely semiotics, 
often claims that besides the quantity of information, a picture or a sketch 
if chosen properly can symbolize, i.e. do something quite complicated in a 
rather simple manner (Sebeok 1994, Cobley 2010).
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(5.1.1) Are these two aspects presented by Wittgenstein’s sketches and 
drawings presented intentionally or not we don’t know? Example of 
the T— and the P–cube seem to show exactly this point. The P–cube 
is made ‘purposely’ and it seems as a reaction to the T–cube even if 
this isn’t stated explicitly, but this is a hypothesis. If there are “grave 
mistakes” in TLP that he tried to correct in PI (PPF), and if T— and 
P— cubes are related to grounding ideas of logic and grammar, given 
that TLP logic become a part of PI grammar, then P–cube at least looks 
like one of such corrections, in this case of T–cube. This issue isn’t 
completely marginal if it is dependent on the basic ideas of the rela-
tion of propositions with facts and/or language–games to forms of life. 
(5.1.2) In other words, if one looks at the cubes, what one could see? 
Perhaps propositions in contrast to language–games, facts in contrast 
to forms of life, and by that (after a reflection) pictures in contrast 
to surveyable representations, a philosophical logic in contrast to a 
philosophical grammar, and a model in contrast to a modeling (as an 
application of a model, because ‘The different conceptions must cor-
respond to different applications.’ RFM 1989 VII 5)? Again, we don’t 
know for sure. We can only guess.
Nonetheless, if (5.1.2) is the case, then at least to some degree Witt-
genstein’s philosophy cannot be fully introduced without such illustrations 
actually being shown or being created as drawings on a board, and if this 
is the case, then the pictorial aspect of his philosophy is important as well 
as the textual. Surely there are not many similar examples in the history of 
philosophy, not even in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Philosophy is still main-
ly done by words and not by drawings or illustrations, even Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy given the quantity of illustrations in his works, as mentioned in 
the remark (1).
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein’s case, if correctly described, seems to show 
that not just general human thinking is in some part pictorial, but also that 
philosophy is in some part pictorial and that it can at least sometimes be pre-
sented by carefully chosen illustrations (not necessarily in comic book form 
like in Wittgenstein for beginners or similar). It looks that the pictorial aspect 
of philosophy is sometimes as important as the textual aspect. 
(5.1.3) The pictorial aspect of philosophy seems to be important in Witt-
genstein’s case, in which illustrative examples don’t play some mar-
ginal role, i.e. as illustrations of some ‘more philosophical’ textual 
parts of his philosophy. They themselves are the ‘pictorial texts’. 
Given that he adopted a morphological method (mainly derived from 
Goethe and Spengler), examples are all there is (or jokes for that matter). One 
could paraphrase Goethe (Goethe 1998:§575) by saying — There is nothing 
behind examples. They themselves are effectively picturing the doctrine. 
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A pictorial example exemplifies itself as an application. What an example 
(exemplum) is taking out (eximere) was out there all the time; it is just (re)
presented in a clear or perspicuous manner.
(5.2) On the other hand, points made in remarks (5) — (5.1.5) cannot 
be proven with sufficient evidence. That he was using many illus-
trations, drawings and sketches in his philosophical works, in fact 
much more than other philosopher of his times, is a fact. That these 
illustrations are integral parts of his examples which stand on their 
own by manifesting the whole point on particular issue is also a fact. 
The fact is too that only few drawings could be found in early and 
later works both concerning a similarly important issues, and that 
the drawing of a cube is such example. Everything beyond that, even 
his own standpoint on the T–cube itself and on the T–cube from the 
point of view of the P–cube is a highly interpretative matter and little 
if anything can be proven with certainty. Therefore, it is permissible 
to talk only about possible interpretations. In the same time the is-
sue should be considered open for the future research, biographical, 
historical, and philosophical as well. 
(5.2.1) The sheer possibility that complicated philosophical issues can 
be presented by simple illustrations and short descriptions contra-
dicts not only the technical nature of the contemporary philosophy, 
but also the public’s general opinion about it as being something 
completely detached or at least semi–detached from our daily reali-
ties. The irony is that Wittgenstein as a philosopher sensitive to the 
pictorial aspect of thought and philosophy is as such rediscovered in 
the 21st century in which the greatest amount of visual philosophy 
is available (for example in comics, animated, short, art an documen-
tary films, etc.) only as a methodical tool, not as the form of philo-
sophical thinking.
Perhaps a paradox emerges here. While being one of the most impor-
tant philosophies of the 20th century, at the same time interpreted in many 
(sometimes radically) different ways even by other great philosophers and 
by being often utterly hard to understand even by his own students, Witt-
genstein’s philosophy manifests the basic feature of contemporary popular 
philosophy and even culture that he despised, namely, the possibility of phi-
losophy being represented by a single illustration, a few words of description, 
and a series of puzzling questions for which there are no obvious answers. 
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Summary
STEADILY CUBIC: A SQUARED ODYSSEY
Wittgenstein’s cube–examples
In the paper, the author analyzes and compares cube examples in Wittgenstein’s 
works, especially the cube from TLP (TLP 1974 5.5432) and the cube from PPF 
(ex PI II) (PPF 2009 116). There is no direct evidence that the PPF–cube is a reac-
tion to the “grave mistake” of the TLP–cube. Also, there is no evidence that the 
TLP–cube is a representation of the Necker’s cube (1832), although it resembles 
the Jastrow’s cube (1900). These are negative results. Both cubes present im-
portant ideas of TLP and PPF (PI). Also, Wittgenstein writes that he “purposely 
chose” the example of the cube in PI and PPF, perhaps to show one of the “grave 
mistakes” of the TLP–cube. By analysis of the Necker’s cube and comparison 
of drawings and accompanied text of the TLP–cube and the PPF–cube the au-
thor tries to explicate some possible implicit pictorial aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
thought and of the general nature philosophical thinking as pictorial. 
KEY WORDS: Boltzmann, Jastrow, Necker, PPF, Russell, TLP, Wittgenstein.
ABBREVIATIONS: T–cube = TLP–cube, P–cube = PPF–cube (ex PI II). 
